Team Full Tilt

A couple of weeks ago, Perry Friedman discussed the importance of being able to look at factors beyond one’s own cards. An experienced player has the ability to think about what his opponent is likely to hold. Beyond that, a top-quality player – a pro – will think a level deeper and consider what he believes his opponent is thinking about his cards.

This summer, at the World Series of Poker* Main Event, an interesting confrontation occurred between two Full Tilt Poker pros and bracelet holders, Mark Vos and Chris Ferguson. With blinds of 500 and 1,000, Chris raised on the button to 3,000. Mark re-raised from the small blind and Chris called.

On a flop of A-J-T, Mark bet 12,000 and Chris called. The turn brought another Jack and Vos bet 15K, and Chris called again. The river was a 2. Mark checked and Chris moved in for his last 20K. Mark thought for a time, then turned a Jack face-up, showing trips, and folded.

Mark discussed his thinking shortly after the hand was played.

I was in the small blind with King-Jack suited. It was folded to Chris Ferguson who had about 70K to start the hand. He raised it to 3,000. I decided I could probably pick it up with a little re-raise, take him off of Ace-rag or a small pair. He thought for a little bit and called. I put him on a very strong hand here. He’s not likely to defend his button raise with a weak hand. I’d been playing pretty tight.

The flop came out A-J-T. I figured if he had a pair of Queens or maybe a pair of Kings he might lay it down, and if he had a small pair, like 9s or 8s, he’d definitely fold. So I bet out 12K. He thought for a little bit and called. At this point, my hand is totally dead; I’m hoping for a Queen.

The turn came a Jack , which is either a suck-out or a trouble card. I have trips with the best kicker I can have without having a full house. I didn’t like the situation, but I felt I had to lead out. Because he could have had A-K or A-Q, or a flush draw. So I bet out 15K, which is pretty weak, because it was about a 40K pot. He called fairly quickly. At that point, my hand is dead. I was half hoping for a King on the river and half not, because it could bust me.

The river was a blank. I checked. He went all in for 20,000. I was fairly certain he had tens full or Aces full, and I folded.

Chris later congratulated Mark on his good fold. He confirmed that he had pocket Aces and had flopped a set and turned a full house.

It takes time to learn to think this deeply about a hand. But if you put in the time and have an open mind, you’re game will get increasingly sophisticated and your profits will grow accordingly.

Rafe Furst

While playing the final table of the $1,500 Pot-Limit Hold ‘em event, I found myself in a difficult spot when we were down to four-handed play. I was in the big blind and Rizen, a tough, respected online tournament pro, was in the small blind. It was folded to Rizen who announced that he would raise the pot. With blinds of 15K/30K, his raise made it 90K to me.

At the time, I had about 400K in chips; Rizen had 750k and the other two players had about 250K each.

I looked at my cards and found As-8s, a pretty solid holding in short-handed play. I decided to raise the size of the pot. My total bet was 180. Rizen immediately re-raised, forcing me all-in.

The pot contained 580,000 (400,000 from Rizen, 180,000 from me) and I had 220,000 remaining. I was getting nearly 3 to 1 on my money, so this looked like an automatic call. I needed to win the pot only about 27 percent of the time to justify a call.

Against a big pocket pair (other than aces), my A-8 suited would win about 32 percent of the time. Against a bigger ace (A-K, A-Q, etc), my A-8 suited would win about 30 percent of the time. There was also a non-zero (though small) chance I was up against a small pocket pair and would win about 50 percent of the time.

So this was almost a zero-equity chip decision. That is, folding and calling would have pretty much same result over the long term. To find the correct action, I had to look beyond pot odds and consider (a) how this hand would affect my cash equity for the tournament (i.e., which action would maximize my expected cash payout) and (b) how this hand would affect my chances of winning the tournament.

There were two factors I looked at when considering my cash equity:

1 – Each chip in a short stack is more valuable in terms of cash-equity than each chip in a large stack. By calling in this situation I would have been risking chips of great value to pick up chips of lesser value.

2 – Folding removes any chance of busting. By folding, I would give my opponents a chance to bust on subsequent hands, which would move me up to a bigger payday.

After looking at these factors, it seemed that folding was the clear choice. But still, I had to think about how folding would effect my ability to win the bracelet – which was my primary concern. Would I be putting myself out of the running by giving up on so many chips? Not really.

When there are more than two players remaining, each additional chip you accumulate has a lesser impact on your ability to win the tournament. So when the chip-equity decision is a wash, you are better off folding than you are trying to accumulate more chips.

If you ever find yourself in a similar situation, you should also keep in mind that there’s a big difference between moving all-in and calling all-in. When you move in, you can win the pot by forcing a fold. When you call, this obviously isn’t possible.

I decided to fold and wait for a better spot, and I’m very glad that I did.

Perry Friedman

I spend a lot of time playing in the low-limit Stud games on Full Tilt Poker. In those games, I’ve encountered a number of players who haven’t come to understand one of poker’s fundamental concepts. These beginners focus only on their own cards; they don’t stop to think about the cards their opponents might hold.

To take a typical example from Stud. I’ve seen players call with low and medium pairs after there has been a raise and a re-raise in front of them. These players are so fixated on their own cards that they don’t stop to ask what hands they’re likely up against. And in these spots, the betting tells a pretty disturbing tale. You can see how one player might raise with something like three high cards, so a pair of 5s or 7s could be best. But a re-raise? That’s an indication of serious strength. At that point, a player should look at his pair and figure that, in all likelihood, he’s up against a higher pair, making his smaller pair a big underdog. Folding is the only proper action.

A winning poker player won’t just evaluate a situation at the start of the hand. He will constantly reassess as more information becomes available. Another example from Stud shows what I mean. Say a player raises on Third Street with the 4d as his up-card and I call with split 9s and a Jack kicker. We play heads-up and Fourth Street gives me a blank, the 5c, while my opponent catches the 8d, giving him two suited cards. He bets and I call. Then on Fifth, he catches another suited card, the Qd, and I make two pair with Jh. He bets again, representing the flush. Could he have caught the flush? It’s possible. But in this case, when I try to determine what my opponent might have, I have to move beyond the cards that I’m currently seeing. I need to consider the actions throughout the hand.

I remember that on Third Street, the player raised with a 4 as his door card. Normally, players who are trying to draw to a flush will try to get in cheap on Third Street; they typically limp and then perhaps, call a raise. So while it’s possible that this player started with something like Ad-Kd-4d, it’s far more likely that he started with something like a middle or big pair in the hole. When I put all this information together, I see that despite the opponent’s scary board, two pair is probably ahead, and I can react accordingly by either calling bets or raising.

This sort of thinking applies to all poker games. Moving beyond your own cards is a key step in coming to think like a winning player. The most sophisticated players in the game think a level deeper still – they consider not only what their opponents hold, but what their opponents think they hold. But that’s the subject for another tip.